UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-1100

ELLIS S. FRISON, JR.,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

PRESTIGE FINANCIAL SERVICES CORPORATION;
PRESTIGE MORTGAGE CORPORATION; STERLING BANK,
FSB; MARAGARETTEN & COMPANY, INCORPORATED;
CHEMICAL MORTGAGE COMPANY; CHEMICAL RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE COMPANY; CHASE MANHATTAN
MORTGAGE CORPORATION,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. T.S. Ellis, III, District Judge. (CA-96-744-A)

Submitted: May 14, 1998 Decided: May 21, 1998

Before WIDENER and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Ellis S. Frison, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Robert J. Zelnick, SZABO, ZELNICK & ERICKSON, P.C., Woodbridge, Virginia; Bernard Joseph DiMuro, DIMURO, GINSBERG & LIEBERMAN, P.C., Alexandria, Virginia; Traci Helene Mundy, VENABLE, BAETJER & HOWARD, McLean, Virginia, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals the district court's final order dismissing his civil action and related orders.* We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinions and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. Frison v. Prestige Financial Servs. Corp., No. CA-96-744-A (E.D. Va. Aug. 26, 1996; Nov. 13 & 21, 1996; Jan. 10, 1997). We deny the "motion for declaratory judgment and restitution" and dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

^{*} In its final order dismissing the action, the district court also denied Appellant's supplemental claims for trespass and to add his wife as a party, and his motion for a temporary injunction. Appellant also appeals the district court's revised order entered on November 21, 1996, the previous order entered November 13, which was revised, and a prior order entered August 26, 1996. Like the final order, we affirm the November 13 and 21 orders on the reasoning of the district court. We deny relief on the August 26 order because we find no reversible error in the claims dismissed by the district court and because Appellant was granted leave to and did file an amended complaint.